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This paper investigates the emotional import of literary devices deployed in fiction. 
Reflecting on the often-favored approach in the analytic tradition that locates fictional 
characters, events, and narratives as sources of readers’ emotions, I attempt to broaden 
the scope of analysis by accounting for how literary devices trigger non-cognitive emo-
tions. I argue that giving more expansive consideration to literary devices by which 
authors present content facilitates a better understanding of how fiction engages emotion. 









“Norman stirred, turned, and then fell into a darkness deeper and more 
engulfing than the swamp.” Thus ends Chapter 5 of Robert Bloch’s Psycho, 
in which Norman has a bad dream about Mother after he buries Mary. Upon 
reading the chapter, I felt a strange sense of fatigue: my body felt weighed 
down, and my breathing became heavier. The experience of bodily feelings 
such as these when engaging with literary fiction is not uncommon. Verily, 
people often notice that literary fiction can evoke bodily responses in them. 
For example, Susan Feagin (2010) remarks that the line “So it goes” in Kurt 
Vonnegut’s work of science fiction Slaughterhouse-five caused her to shiver. 
Contemporary critics of horror often comment that a work of literary horror 
“makes your flesh creep” or “sends chills down your spine.” 
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However, how does reading fiction in silence, a “rather bodiless activity,” 
stir readers somatically?  An intuitive explanatory answer is through emo-
tion. As for how a work engages readers’ emotions, an approach often fa-
vored by analytical philosophy turns to the plot and narrative, and fictional 
characters and events, for an explanation while leaving literary devices and 
stylistic elements underinvestigated. In other words, this approach tends 
to foreground content independent of how the content is presented, i.e., 
the style of a work.1 I call this the “content-based approach.” The approach 
makes sense to the extent that fiction, as Nick Zangwill sees it, “involves con-
tent first and foremost” (cited in Kivy 2011, 37). Zangwill’s claim is true, 
especially for philosophers who take literary fiction as a vehicle for philo-
sophical themes or ethical inquiry.2 What merits more philosophical interest 
is, therefore, the propositional content.  A related view motivating this ap-
proach is that our emotional responses to a work are products of proposi-
tional, cognitive states—be they “fictional truths,” “thought-content,” or “per-
ceptual beliefs”—that the reader can garner from the work’s content. This 
paper intends to make a case for the inclusion of literary devices as a proper 
object of study in the analytic framework of fiction and emotion. I first take 
a brief critical look at a content-based approach, namely, Noël Carroll’s 
criterial prefocusing model, which accounts for how fiction engages emo-
tions. After showing its limitations, I turn to an alternative model proposed 
by Jenefer Robinson (2005). Based on Robinson’s model, I account for how 
literary devices deployed in fiction trigger non-cognitive emotion and con-
tribute to our emotional engagement. I flesh out my account using passages 
taken from The Reef and Psycho. 
 
1. A Content-Based Approach 
 
Carroll’s criterial prefocusing model leans toward cognitive emotions. 
The cognitive theory of emotion—in which a propositional, cognitive state is 
necessary for emotion—informed his choice of focus. Despite his recent con-
cession that emotions are more often non-cognitive, affective responses, 
                                                 
1 Some examples of philosophers who lean towards this approach are Kendall Walton 
(1990) in his Mimesis as Make-Believe, Martha Nussbaum (1995), and Noël Carroll, whose 
works will be discussed shortly. 
2 For example Nussbaum (1992, 23-29) approaches literary texts as indispensable 
components in ethical inquiry. Carroll’s (2001) clarification view also purports that narra-
tive fiction can clarify our moral understanding and emotions. 
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he insists that our emotional responses to literature are cognitive because 
“they must be engaged imaginatively and understood” and “they are not 
reducible to perceptual responses” (2020, 9). 
Carroll (2001) explains that cognitive emotions occur when cognition 
subsumes an event or object under a specific criterion or category. For ex-
ample, anger occurs when one’s cognition subsumes an event in the category 
of a “wrong done to me or mine,” which is a criterion appropriate to the emo-
tion anger. Similarly, in reading fiction, cognitive emotion occurs when read-
ers subsume fictional events under a specific category. One of his favorite 
illustrative examples is Uncle Tom’s Cabin, in which the author confronts 
readers with scenes of black families being separated and emphasizes the 
innocence and decency of the slaves “whose family ties are being sundered, 
and the cruelty and callousness with which it is being done” (2001, 226). 
So, the author prompts readers to “perceive the scenes under the category of 
injustice,” which elicits in the readers “the affect of indignation” (2001, 226). 
Carroll (2020) suggests that emotion directs our attention like a search-
light, scanning the environment for features that are subsumable under our 
reigning emotional state and that are vital to our interests; it “sound[s] bod-
ily alarms that rivet our attention” (10). Meanwhile, unlike everyday situa-
tions in which emotionally pertinent features are selected from a massive 
array of largely unstructured stimuli, the details have usually been struc-
tured and made salient by fiction writers. As we have seen, he relies on         
a salient description of cruelty to explain how Uncle Tom’s Cabin provokes 
readers’ emotions.3 We could draw another example from a novel about   
a zombie apocalypse, in which the writer may “describe in gory adjectival 
excess the suppurating bodies of the zombies, their decay and fragmenta-
tion” to engender the affect of disgust (2020, 11). 
One may doubt that salient depiction alone guarantees emotional en-
gagement; salient depictions of battles in a treatise on military tactics, for 
instance, have little emotion-inducing capacity. Carroll seems to notice this 
problem when he adds another necessary condition; the narratives should 
enlist readers’ specific concerns, preferences, or pro-attitudes—any attitudes 
in favor of something. They prompt readers to find out if the protagonists in 
the previous imagined zombie apocalypse novel survive, or to hope for the 
rectification of the wrongs done to the black families in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. 
                                                 
3 Nussbaum (1995, 93-97) likewise focuses on how Richard Wright’s Native Son re-
cruits white readers’ sympathy for the black character Bigger Thomas by “drawing atten-
tion to misery”, focusing their attention on the individual, and guiding readers to see the 
world—and the disadvantaged situation he is in—through his eyes .  
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Still, a problem with this model is that while it may explain how literary 
fiction engenders standard, garden-variety emotions, it does not accommo-
date the more complicated, ineffable ones. Carroll’s model quite readily sorts 
emotions into nameable categories. Conversely, critics often say that,    
for example, Kafka’s works can induce a “sensory reaction” and emotions 
“of some sort” in readers, which can be described only through approxima-
tions such as “pain,” “awe,” or “horror.”  Robinson (2005) also notes that by 
reading a significant literary work like Edith Wharton’s The Reef, some 
evoked emotions do not involve subsuming a fictional event under a crite-
rion appropriate to a particular nameable emotion. Admittedly, critics and 
readers often do communicate emotions with others in terms of existing 
nameable emotions. However, the shades of emotions experienced during 
reading can be more subtle, complex, and ambivalent, eluding Carrollian 
categorization. 
This limitation, I think, results from applying the “criterion of appropri-
ateness” of real-life emotions to fictional emotions. Undeniably, many fic-
tional emotions do follow similar criteria of appropriateness as these every-
day emotions. Nevertheless, writers may also create emotions in a far less 
formulaic way than those governed by appropriateness criteria. Carroll is 
rather insistent that the criteria for horror are harmfulness and impurity. 
However, in literary horror, readers can be horrified by harmless and ordi-
nary objects like the fire hose (Stephen King’s The Shining) or a withering 
apple tree (Daphne Du Maurier’s The Apple Tree). At the same time, Carroll 
tends to link pro-attitudes and concerns with positive human characters. 
However, in Robert Bloch’s Psycho, readers are made to sympathize with 
Norman Bates, an unlikeable and charmless serial killer who fails to be  
an appropriate object of pro-attitudes and concerns. 
Carroll has submitted different defenses to this line of objection. A recent 
one is that his criterial prefocusing model is still “the more perspicuous way” 
to handle these more complicated emotions (2020, 18). He explains that 
one can adopt “reverse engineering”: we may observe that the features of 
the situation made salient by the author point in different directions (say, 
“joy” and “sadness”), then work backward to a more appropriate and com-
plicated emotion (say, “bittersweet”). Regarding concerns for unlikeable or 
evil characters, he opines that “sympathy for the devil” in fiction results from 
readers’ shifting moral assessments of the situation (1990, 142-143).    
He elsewhere (2013) attributes viewers’ tendency to ally with the fictional 
mobster-boss Tony Soprano to the moral structure of the fictional world, 
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in which Tony is the lesser evil and thus the best candidate for the alliance. 
As such, his approach to more complicated emotions still leans towards cog-
nitive emotions that have their source in the content. 
Even so, his model receives other criticisms. Robinson (2005) casts doubt 
on the mechanism by which Carroll says authors evoke emotions. She notes 
that authors evoke readers’ emotions only after their cognition subsumes 
fictional characters or events under specific criteria appropriate to emotion 
in this model. Robinson retorts that readers can also feel emotionally  
engaged before categorizing the fictional characters or events under any 
criteria appropriate to an emotion—although the emotions involved could 
be “coarse” or “rough” in their initial stages. To form judgments about the 
fictional characters or events, readers often reflect on their emotions after-
ward. 
To this objection, Carroll might reply that such categorization does not 
have to be a conscious operation, “no more than my recognition that an on-
coming car is potentially harmful need be accompanied by my saying it” 
(2001, 27). That is why readers might feel as if they were emotionally en-
gaged before they engaged in any categorization. However, even if we accept 
that categorization may operate below the level of consciousness, the rela-
tionship between attention and categorization is still not clear. In this model, 
an emotion occurs after the appropriate categorization, yet the categoriza-
tion occurs after the reader’s attention is drawn to certain emotion-relevant 
aspects of the fictional character or event. Although Carroll suggests that 
those emotion-relevant aspects stand out by salient depiction, I cannot help 
wonder: on what grounds does the salient depiction draw the readers’ atten-
tion, with the result that the depiction emotionally prompts the readers to 
subsume what they read in the first place? As Robinson also notes, “Although 
what our attention is drawn to may be ‘subsumable’ under some emotion 
category, we do not actually subsume it under a category until after our at-
tention has been fixed upon it” (2005, 183). 
The move of supplementing his model with pro-attitudes, concerns, and 
preferred outcomes invested by the narrative does not help for a similar 
reason. We can still ask, what makes the narrative so successfully engaging 
that the readers are invested with pro-attitudes, concerns, and preferred 
outcomes? The same narrative with the same characters can fail to invest 
readers with pro-attitudes, et cetera, if an unskillful writer handles it. Per-
haps the readers’ attention has to be drawn to relevant details in the first 
place and fixed or sustained to become invested with pro-attitudes and pre-
ferred outcomes that guarantee emotional responses. In other words, while 
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Carroll is right that emotion is attention-guiding, his model does not explain 
what fixes our initial attention on emotion-relevant details and what drives 
the readers’ cognition to subsume what they read emotionally. 
 
2. Robinson’s Model 
 
Robinson (2005) constructs an alternative model to Carroll’s based on the 
embodied appraisal theory of emotion. On this theory, an emotional re-
sponse is, paradigmatically, an “(1) automatic bodily response that (2) makes 
something salient to the organism (focuses the organism on something), and 
(3) what it makes salient or focuses on is something registered as significant 
to its well-being” (2003, 241). This conception of emotion coincides with 
what psychologists call “quick and dirty feelings” or “affects,” whose function 
is to heighten attention and get ready for action. Since emotions are pri-
marily affective, embodied appraisals, a bodily perturbation without cogni-
tive states and below the subject’s conscious awareness can trigger emo-
tions. In other words, as Carroll has also conceded, cognitive states are not 
necessary for emotion. 
Accordingly, Robinson deems that literary fiction can activate readers’ 
affective appraisals before any meaningful content for cognitive categoriza-
tion is available to them. A narrative can induce what she calls “coarse or 
rough” emotions. They appraise “in a coarse-grained way: this is good/bad, 
friend/enemy, strange and threatening/safe and familiar” (2005, 183). 
Robinson’s characterization of “coarse or rough” emotions is reminiscent of 
the Nietzschean idea of basic affect, which is an inclination or aversion to 
what is going on.4 The coarse-grained affective appraisal can seize readers’ 
initial attention, making the emotion-related details of the narrative salient. 
Focusing on those details in turns prompts readers to appraise in a “more 
fine-grained way” (Robinson 2005, 183), which typically recruits cognitive 
assessment of subsequent fictional characters/events, whereby cognitive 
emotions towards those fictional characters/events occur. When readers 
become emotionally involved in a narrative, both coarse-grained affective 
appraisals and the more fine-grained cognitive evaluations provide feedback 
to readers, which may configure, sustain, intensify or dissipate an emotion 
towards the characters/events as the narrative progresses. So Robinson 
remarks that in being emotionally engaged with a sophisticated narrative, 
“there is a succession of affective and cognitive appraisals going on all the 
                                                 
4 See for example Nietzsche (2019), section 34.  
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time” (2005, 183). Although readers may not be conscious of every affective 
and cognitive appraisal in the process, if the experience taken as a whole is 
rich and intense, it will prompt readers to engage in after-the-fact reflection. 
Furthermore, usually, it is when readers reflect on the experience that the 
emotions are cataloged. 
The merit of Robinson’s model is that it fills in the missing piece in Car-
roll’s model. Recall that Carroll’s model does not explain what makes read-
ers’ attention “emotionally charged” in the first place. Robinson’s model sug-
gests that the quick and dirty, coarse or rough emotions can do the trick. 
To word it another way, if a piece of literary fiction engages emotion by, for 
example, investing readers with pro-attitudes, concerns, and preferred out-
comes, the emotion is better guaranteed if the text is emotion-laden in the 
first place so that the engagement directs the readers’ attention to relevant 
details that aim to develop those pro-attitudes, concerns and preferred out-
comes. Readers are then prompted to follow the plot and evaluate the fic-
tional characters/events in a more fine-grained way. 
As for how literary fiction can be emotion-laden in a way that grabs read-
ers’ initial attention, rendering it emotionally-charged, one answer may turn 
to descriptions of a character’s inner states.5 The psychologists Kneepkens 
and Zwaan (1994) find that personally-involving details about a character 
are one type of emotional, “interesting information,” which takes less effort 
and conscious control to attend to and memorize than unemotional (though 
important) information. Robinson likewise regards “careful description of 
the emotional states of the characters” as a way to engage readers’ emotions, 
whereby they are “made to focus attention on certain situations and to see 
them in a certain way” (2005, 158). She instances a passage taken from Edith 
Wharton’s The Reef: 
 
‘Unexpected obstacle. Please don’t come till thirtieth. Anna.’ All the way from Charing 
Cross to Dover the train had hammered the words of the telegram into George Dar-
row’s ears, ringing every change of irony on its commonplace syllables: rattling them 
out like a discharge of musketry, letting them, one by one, drip slowly and coldly into 
his brain, or shaking, tossing, transposing them like the dice in some game of the gods 
of malice; and now, as he emerged from his compartment at the pier, and stood facing 
the wind-swept platform and the angry sea beyond, they leapt out at him as if from 
the crest of the waves, stung and blinded him with a fresh fury of derision. ‘Unex-
pected obstacle. Please don’t come till thirtieth. Anna.’ (Cited in Robinson 2005, 161). 
 
                                                 
5 I opt for a pluralistic approach to fictional emotions, so I am only suggesting that de-
scription of a character’s inner states is just one of a number of effective ways to do this. 
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Robinson comments that Wharton realistically describes Darrow’s inner 
states induced by the telegram. The passage dramatizes Darrow’s emotional 
states regarding his interaction with the environment and relation to the 
world but not in terms of his beliefs or cognitive judgments about Anna or 
the telegram. The passage features “the sound of the train, the cold unwel-
coming sea, the wet gloomy weather” and the crowd on the pier: “they too 
seem to reject him and to be either hostile or indifferent” (2005, 161). These 
are the unpleasant qualities in the environment that are made salient in Dar-
row’s perception of it. Also, the passage both begins and ends with the words 
in Anna’s telegram. The repetition expresses Darrow’s obsessive focus on the 
telegram. To Robinson, this passage is an acceptable illustration of how Dar-
row’s emotional responses unfold in ways that approximate her embodied 
appraisal theory of emotion but not the cognitive theory of emotion. 
To me, this passage can also serve as an apt illustration of how literary fic-
tion can secure readers’ emotional involvement with a character before any 
meaningful content for cognitive categorization is available. Clearly, the pas-
sage describes a somewhat unpleasant situation: Darrow is upset by Anna’s 
telegram. However, as this is the novel’s opening passage, readers do not 
know anything about Darrow and what happened between him and Anna. 
It is not likely that readers have any attitudes towards or concerns about him 
or have subsumed the situation emotionally in the way described by Carroll’s 
model. 
Still, one may notice that on my current reading, the emotion aroused 
in readers may be explained by the propositional state “Darrow is upset.” 
The analysis remains somewhat content-based. So, questions arise: can the 
passage enlist an even coarser-grained emotion than this, one which the 
content alone cannot adequately explain? Is Carroll right that our emotions 
in response to literary fiction are cognitive after all? 
 
3. Why Literary Devices Matter 
 
My answer to the questions raised is that the passage’s style by which 
propositional content is presented plays a role in its emotional impact. 
The Reef’s opening passage enlists non-cognitive emotion of negative valence 
through its literary devices. The term “literary devices” refers to what Robin-
son calls “verbal form,” i.e., syntactic and rhetorical devices including but not 
limited to parallelism, asyndeton, rhyme, rhythm, and imagery (2005, 212-
213), or what Feagin dubs “verbal features,” which encompass “diction, nar-
rative voice, style, sentence structure—in short, anything about the way lan-
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guage is used in the work” (1996, 132). Robinson contends that literary de-
vices function to guide readers’ emotional responses, focusing attention and 
influencing readers’ initial affective appraisals and subsequent cognitive 
evaluation of the content. Feagin likewise maintains that verbal features of 
language often elicit affective responses. Verbal features can encourage or 
heighten feelings such as uneasiness, curiosity, eagerness, et cetera, all of 
which facilitate readers’ engagement with a fictional scenario.6 
Although Robinson illustrates her contention using poems and does not 
discuss how literary devices function in The Reef’s opening passage, I do not 
see much difficulty extending her claim to the passage.  Let us explore the 
passage more in-depth in light of her contention by examining its verbal 
features. It starts with a contrast: a single, lengthy sentence that expresses 
Darrow’s unsettling flux of feelings and perceptions provoked by the words 
in Anna’s telegram follows the short and bluntly formal sentences of Anna’s 
telegram. The use of a lengthy sentence filled with kinesthetic imagery in-
scribes the processual, on-going shades of feelings and perceptions into this 
emotional episode, rendering it a fluctuating motion. By calling the words in 
the telegram “commonplace syllables,” it seems that Wharton wants to direct 
readers’ attention to the sonic contrast of the subsequent lines, which indeed 
feature, for example, a series of adverbial participles (“ringing,” “rattling,” 
“shaking,” “tossing,” “transposing”) with trills or fricative sounds. Together 
with the choppy phrases and clauses, the lengthy line develops a distinct, 
quavering rhythm. 
In this way, the passage is apt to enact a rhythmic but mildly strenuous 
and bumpy moving experience, and consequently, a mild sense of strain in 
readers. The line may also get readers to form in their mind a sequence of 
fleeting, visual images of a variety of movements accompanied by jagged 
sound imagery, such as a shaking train compartment, discharging musketry, 
blowing wind and a roaring sea with waves in motion, however faint and 
transient they are. Indeed, words mediate the imagined perceptual states, 
but the end-product is more like a collage of images that do not necessarily 
form propositional content. I venture that the verbal features breed negative, 
non-cognitive emotion that agitates readers, activating their affective under-
standing of Darrow’s inner emotional state. The negative emotion’s sources 
go beyond the propositional state “Darrow is upset.” It secures the readers’ 
initial attention and interest, prompting them to read more about what had 
                                                 
6 However, Feagin (1996, 78) holds a cognitive theory of emotion and deems that 
mere affective responses are not emotions. Following Robinson, my position is that the 
affective responses under consideration in this section are emotions. This is not to say, 
however, that all responses elicited by verbal features are emotions. 
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happened between Darrow and Anna. It may invest them with the attitude 
towards Darrow, even though they know very little about him. Recall Car-
roll’s remark that emotional responses to literature are cognitive, provided 
that they must involve imagination and understanding. Conversely, I am try-
ing to characterize here the kind of understanding and imagination as not 
necessarily propositional. It involves embodied understanding of movement 
on the one hand and sensory (or imagistic) imagination—which is typically 
characterized as a non-propositional use of images—on the other.7 
To experience the passage in this way involves what Mark Johnson calls 
“embodied meaning-making.” The “embodied meaning” of a passage is to be 
contrasted with its propositional, linguistic meaning; it “goes beyond words” 
(2008, 219).  Johnson notes that in poetry, various senses, including sight, 
hearing, smell, and taste, typically develop the non-propositional embodied 
meanings and richly felt qualities; they are dependent on “the precise 
rhythm of images, sounds, pauses, and intensifications” (2008, 220) that 
constitute the style of a work. These sensory qualities resonate with readers 
in different ways, animating parts of readers’ corporeal understanding of the 
subject matter and the sensations, feelings, or emotions that the content 
expresses. 
Johnson states that the non-propositional embodied meanings and richly 
felt qualities of poems could often be seen, though admittedly to a lesser 
degree, in prose language. In The Stranger, Johnson instances that Camus’s 
“almost Hemingway-like conciseness and sparseness,” or what is called Ca-
mus’s impersonal, expository, lucid, flat “white style,”8 expresses Meursault’s 
indifferent attitude to the world. However, the images, sensations, rhythms, 
and pulsations of some passages in the funeral scenes “carry the reader 
along by evoking a vast sea of unconscious, or barely conscious, connections 
and feelings” (2008, 223), activating readers’ corporeal understanding of 
Meursault’s subjective, private experiences of his mother’s funeral. It occurs 
to me that in some cases, the impact of the literary devices in prose language 
is so perceptible that (sensitive) readers are aware of how their sensory 
qualities resonate with their body. The aesthetician Zhu Guangqian observes 
that on reading Chinese prose written in a “clanging tone” and “smooth 
rhythm,” the muscles all over his soma undergo similarly rhythmic move-
ments of alternating tension and alleviation, rendering in him the feeling of 
pleasure; conversely, his muscles feel “constrained and uneasy” when read-
ing prose with inharmonious tones or “flawed” rhythm (1994, 124). 
                                                 
7 See Landland-Hassen 2016, 64. 
8 See Susan Sontag 2001, 16. 
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Perhaps it can be said that some prose language can appeal to readers’ 
bodies in ways analogical to visual images and music. My surmises do not 
sound too fanciful if we consider that literary scholars characterize literary 
devices (e.g., imagery, repetitions, rhythm) as means of engaging readers’ 
bodily sensations (e.g., Steidele 2007; Solander 2013), or how philosophers 
in the continental tradition write about prose language’s musicality (e.g., 
Deleuze 1997; Wiskus 2014). Specifically, Deleuze remarks that “there is also 
a painting and a music characteristic of writing, like the effects of colors and 
sonorities that rise up above words” (Deleuze 1997, Iv). 
That being said, I am aware that my account is not without challenges. 
In my analysis of Wharton’s passage, one possible source of emotion is the 
visual and/or aural images excited by the passage filled with imageries, 
yet Peter Kivy would be dismissive of this view. Kivy rejects that silent read-
ing of fiction excites visual and aural images in readers’ minds that are 
“no less distinct” than the images experienced as if they were initially eye-
witnesses (2011, 131). These views are, he argues, based on a faulty Lockean 
model of language according to which words, “by constant use,” readily excite 
“Ideas” that affect the “Senses” (Locke 1975/1964, 261). The “Ideas” are 
tokens of the same type as the ideas that would be caused to arise if one saw 
the object signified by the words (Kivy 2011, 131). Kivy adduces Edmund 
Burke’s remarks that words rarely produce any visual or aural images in 
readers’ minds and that a particular effort of the imagination is required for 
their occurrence, further suggesting that “our speed of language comprehen-
sion far outstrips our ability to form mental images” (2011, 23). Kivy adds 
that even if readers sometimes entertain vivid mental images, they are far 
from “talking pictures” that, I take him to mean, carry propositional content. 
As a proponent of the cognitive theory of emotion, Kivy expectedly disre-
gards mental images as a legitimate source of emotions. 
Before submitting responses to this possible challenge, it should be noted 
that Kivy and I subscribe to different theories of emotion. Following Robin-
son’s embodied appraisal theory of emotion on which cognitive states that 
carry propositional content are not necessary for an emotion to occur, my 
account does not require Kivy’s “talking pictures” for emotion to occur. 
What interests me is Burke’s empirical claims, adduced by Kivy, about the 
frequency and likelihood of forming mental images in silent reading. I sus-
pect that forming mental images varies with the prose language’s quality and 
the readers. It is probably easier to excite visual and aural images in readers, 
for example, who grow up in a multi-media environment than those who do 
not, for the former are used to learning stories through (and thus have more 
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mental resources connected to) aural and moving visual images. Other lived 
experiences (e.g., traveling experiences) are likely additional sources of such 
mental resources. It is not to say that the imagistic imagination is a mere 
matter of retrieving images from memory. Because our memory is prone to 
confabulation and that concurrent emotion can color our state of mind, I am 
inclined to say that the imagination is closer to fabrication.9 
Next, empirical studies seem to show that the phenomenon of forming 
mental images while reading is not as unusual as Burke and Kivy think. 
Recent findings in psychology (e.g., Speer et al. 2009, Foroni et al. 2009) re-
veal that reading narrative texts often activate brain regions that process 
experiences of sights, sounds, tastes, and movements and that verbal, emo-
tional stimuli drive muscle activation. Another pertinent phenomenon is 
hearing inner voices during reading, which the activation of the auditory 
cortex’s voice-selective areas explains (Yao et al., 2011). In this context, it is 
also worth mentioning that recent neuroscientific studies show that imagin-
ing sound has a “measurable effect on areas of the brain directly related to 
the perception of sound” (Grimshaw & Garner 2014, 1) and that imaginary 
stimuli can generate emotion via the same causal pathway as real stimuli (1). 
As already noted, Kivy admits the occasional occurrence of mental im-
ages, though he refuses to see them as a legitimate source of (cognitive) emo-
tion. He also fully acknowledges the phenomenon of hearing inner voices 
during silent reading. He nevertheless is reluctant to count these perceptual 
experiences as the aesthetic experience of prose fiction. One reason for this 
is that readers seldom take the perpetual properties of prose language as 
the direct object of artistic attention. Another reason is that the perceptual 
experiences are far less significant when compared to those arising from 
poetry. The second point, I concede, is true. As a less content-based form of 
writing, poetry, in general, relies more heavily on verbal features and sound 
quality than on content for their impact. As Schopenhauer once remarked: 
“I remember from early childhood that I was delighted for a long time by the 
pleasant sounds of verse before I discovered that it made sense and con-
tained thoughts as well” and that “even trivial thoughts gain a measure of 
significance through rhythm and rhyme” (2014, 446). 
                                                 
9 As such, the images are not necessarily “token[s] of the same type” as ideas evoked 
by real objects either. In fact, I opine that different readers probably have different ver-
sions of the images. For example, in the image of the discharging musketry that came to 
my mind when reading Wharton’s passage, the musket is pointing right; other readers 
may imagine it differently. 
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With limited space, I do not wish to enter into the debate with Kivy over 
whether the perceptual experiences arising from prose fiction are suffi-
ciently significant to be qualified under his conception of “aesthetic experi-
ence.” Instead, my suggestion is that there seems to be no reason to rule out 
that skillful deployment of verbal features in fiction can have a causal power 
similar to that identified in poetry by Schopenhauer, albeit to a lesser degree. 
I hope my discussion thus far is convincing enough to make a case for it. 
It remains probable that even if readers are occupied mainly by the content 
and seldom take prose language as the direct object of artistic attention, 
as Kivy asserts, their affective appraisals can be simultaneously triggered, 
often subliminally, by the verbal features of the passages. Taken together, 
even if our emotional responses to fiction are not reducible to non-cognitive, 
perceptual responses, as Carroll holds, this does not rule out their occur-
rence. The non-cognitive, affective responses can still be contributory to the 
emotional experience. Indeed, in my analysis, Wharton’s passage can enlist 
both our cognitive and non-cognitive responses, and both the verbal features 
and the content combine to create the passage’s full-blown emotional ef-
fect.10 
Thus I agree with Feagin (1992) that affective responses to fiction are not 
merely mediated by thoughts generated from the content but are often mani-
festations of sensitivities to the style of the work and its verbal features.11 
This view, Feagin insightfully adds, “provides impetus for the view that there 
are special sorts of “aesthetic experiences” offered by literary fiction whose 
qualitatively distinctive character is unlike ordinary, everyday experience” 
(1996, 135). It also sheds light on how a work configures the more compli-
cated emotions mentioned in section II, say, “sympathy for the devil.” In what 
follows, I illustrate my view with the case of Psycho, the novel with which my 
paper begins. 
As already noted, Bloch’s Psycho manages to get readers to sympathize 
with the unlikeable Norman. In the film adaptation, Hitchcock gets viewers 
to side with him by detailing Norman’s silent concealment of Mary’s murder, 
making the viewers feel “an uncanny profound satisfaction of a job properly 
done” (Žižek 2004). In the novel, Bloch did this by spending the whole of 
                                                 
10 Derek Matravers (1998) similarly argues that the non-propositional properties of 
literature matter for a full explanation of our emotional reactions to it. He brings up liter-
ary devices such as tone of voice, imagery, repetition, sibilance, et cetera (91, 97). In this 
paper, I go one step further to explore their somatic effects. 
11 That probably explains why the impact of a literary fiction can be weakened by 
reading an (unskillful) translated version.  
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Chapter 5 (51-63) using alternating verbal features when describing 
Norman’s actions and his inner states about concealing Mary’s murder.12 
For example, on the third page of Chapter 5, Norman ponders, 
 
The girl had driven in alone, said she’d been on the road all day. That meant she 
wasn’t visiting en route. And she didn’t seem to know where Fairvale was, didn’t men-
tion any other towns nearby, so the chances were she had no intention of seeing any-
one around here. Whoever expected her—if anyone was expecting her—must live 
some distance further North. 
Of course this was all supposition, but it seemed logical enough. And he’d have to 
take a chance on being right. 
She had signed the register, of course, but that meant nothing. If anybody ever 
asked, he’d say that she had spent the night and driven on. 
All he had to do was get rid of the body and the car and make sure that everything 
was cleaned up afterward. 
That part would be easy. He knew just how to do it. It wouldn’t be pleasant, but it 
wouldn’t be difficult either. 
And it would save him from going to the police. It would save Mother. 
Oh, he still intended to have things out with her—he wasn’t backing down on that 
part of it, not this time—but this could wait until afterward. 
The big thing now was to dispose of the evidence. The corpus delicti (53). 
 
From the second paragraph on, this passage stands out for its noticeably 
short, consecutive paragraphs, within which the sentences are syntactically 
simple, and wordings are straightforward. It can be read with the pleasure 
of lucidity. They run as if Norman was thinking aloud to himself (e.g., ‘Oh’). 
The passage orders Norman’s flow of thoughts in a distinct “step-by-step” 
rhythm, which registers the logical reckoning of Norman’s plan. If the verbal 
features are a bit too conspicuous, they mark Norman’s conscious, controlled 
effort to structure his thoughts and focus of attention. They qualitatively 
mimic Norman’s thought process and encourage readers to follow the 
rhythm of Norman’s thoughts, working to “synchronize” the readers’ 
thoughts with Norman’s. The passage aims to get readers to “think along” 
with Norman, despite being guised in the third person mode. 
 
Shortly afterwards Norman resolved in carrying out his plan. He first had to look 
for a container for the corpus delicti.  
 
Norman went down to the basement and opened the door of the old fruit cellar. 
He found what he was looking for – a discarded clothes hamper with a sprung cover. 
It was large enough and it would do nicely. 
                                                 
12 I am aware that other content-related factors, such as Mary’s death and Norman’s 
voyeuristic behavior, can also prompt or hinder a reader’s alliance with Norman.  
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Nicely—God, how can you think like that about what you’re proposing to do? 
He winced at the realization, and took a deep breath. This was no time to be self-
conscious or self-critical. One had to be practical. Very practical, very careful, very 
calm. 
Calmly, he tossed his clothes into the hamper. Calmly, he took an old oilcloth from 
the table near the cellar stairs. Calmly, he went back upstairs, snapped off the kitchen 
light, snapped off the hall light, and let himself out of the house in darkness, carrying 
the hamper with the oilcloth on top (54). 
 
This passage contains a brief moment of tension when Norman cogni-
tively monitors his positive reaction to the hamper. It triggers the cognitive 
emotions of guilt and shame in him. For readers who still refuse to side with 
Norman, this self-reproach works to gain their sympathy.13 For readers who 
already do so, or who even are slightly delighted by the hamper as Norman 
was, Norman’s sudden thought (expressed by the sentence in italics) may 
function like a vague alarm that distances them from Norman. Nevertheless, 
immediately the tension dissipates as Bloch gets Norman to pull himself 
together by the reassuring line ending in diminishing syllables, “Very practi-
cal, very careful, very calm.” The line descends towards the succeeding para-
graph featuring the repetitive use of “Calmly,” in which the use of a similar 
form of the sentences’ grammatical construction, parallelism, strikes a sense 
of regularity and steadiness in readers. A sense of rhythm recurs, and this 
time it registers Norman’s actions. As the sentences become lengthier,      
a vague sense of gradual restoration of stability is felt. It ends in a moment of 
“ease.” The passage continues, 
 
It was harder to be calm here in the dark. Harder not to think about a hundred and 
one things that might go wrong. 
Mother had wandered off—where? Was she out on the highway, ready to be 
picked up by anyone who might come driving by? Was she still suffering a hysterical 
reaction, would the shock of what she had done caused her to blurt out the truth to 
whoever came along and found her? Had she run away, or was she merely in a daze? 
Maybe she’d gone down past the woods back of the house, along the narrow ten-acre 
strip of their land which stretched off into the swamp. Wouldn’t it be better to search 
for her first? 
Norman sighed and shook his head. He couldn’t afford the risk. […] (54-55). 
 
                                                 
13 Self-reproach is a rhetoric strategy for inducing sympathy for problematic charac-
ters. See Wayne Booth’s (1983) The Rhetoric of Fiction. Relieving anxiety is another, which 
is also used in this passage.  
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Here the instability of Norman’s emotions and wondering thoughts are 
inscribed in a lengthier paragraph containing a mixture of structurally dif-
ferent sentences of irregular lengths. Unlike the previous passages, this 
paragraph does not course forward in a noticeable rhythm but progresses 
in an untethered rush. Moreover, note how the third-person mode gradually 
fades away. It fades so smoothly that readers are now, with or without their 
awareness of it, made to read the lines as if Norman were addressing them 
directly, hammering his floods of worries and doubts into their head. Read-
ers are tugged out from Norman’s thoughts as the third person mode re-
sumes, just before Bloch confronts them again with Norman’s recurring self-
doubts, torrents of emotions, and bodily sensations accompanying his ac-
tions as the chapter proceeds. 
Perhaps it can be said that the author designs verbal features to gradually 
break down the readers’ psychological resistance to Norman (if there is any), 
gently sliding them into Norman’s frame of mind. They work to facilitate 
readers’ affective understanding of, and spontaneous engagement with, 
Norman’s labor and inner turmoil, paving the way for their eventual sym-
pathy for Norman. Regardless of the extent to which readers are transported 
to Norman’s frame of mind, the ebb and flow of changes in the passages 
sustain readers’ interest in, and attention to, what Norman is going through. 
As a qualitative whole, the changes are sometimes felt like a particular cours-
ing forward or inward, other times a pulling away; sometimes there is      
a sense of strain, other times one of ease. Consequently, reading the passages 
as a whole induces the experience of effort. When it comes to the end of 





I hope I have presented a compelling case for taking literary devices as 
proper objects in a philosophical investigation of fiction and emotion. I offer 
a framework that synthesizes philosophical inquiry with other academic 
disciplines in understanding the somatic dimension of reading fiction in 
silence. I hope that the synthesis can enrich and advance debates on fiction 
and emotion. Specifically, I have shown how a passage’s verbal features can 
induce moving experiences and sensory images, identified as two possible 
triggers of non-cognitive embodied appraisals. The two related mechanisms 
involved in the reading experience are the embodied understanding         
of movement and non-propositional, sensory imagination. However, given 
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the variety of styles and content that fiction offers, I do not wish to claim that 
either of these two mechanisms is necessary in all cases, though I believe 
that they are the more dominant ones. As said, my framework is not exhaus-
tive. There seems to be no formulaic rule for the two mechanisms to operate 
in different cases either. As shown in my reading of Psycho, the passages 
activate readers’ corporeal understanding of Norman’s movements of 
thoughts and his body, so the embodied understanding of movement is 
probably the dominating mechanism, though not necessarily to the exclusion 
of sensory imagination. The somatic experience may draw more on readers’ 
embodied understanding of movement, and less on imagistic imagination, 
than Wharton’s imagery-packed passage depicting how the environment 
appears to Darrow. 
Despite this, by broadening the spotlight to illuminate the content and 
literary devices by which the content is presented, we are armed with more 
conceptual tools to appreciate literary passages’ expressive value. Doing 
so offers a fuller picture than the content-based approach of how a passage 
(such as the example in Wharton’s The Reef) can focus readers’ initial atten-
tion in a way that prompts their emotional engagement even before      
any meaningful content for cognitive judgments is available to them. It also 
sheds light on how a work configures the more complicated emotion of sym-
pathy for the devil, one in which readers’ cognitive judgments and emotions 
probably come apart. Recall Carroll’s view that sympathy for the devil can 
result from readers shifting their moral assessment of the situation. If this is 
plausible, then my reading of Psycho explains such a shift. It shows how 
literary devices can be deployed to shape our moral assessments through 
influencing our initial affective appraisals and subsequent cognitive evalua-
tion. They are typically not our object of attention, yet they enlist various 
non-cognitive, emotional, perceptual, or embodied states. We may not be 
aware of how such devices resonate with our body, nor are we conscious of 
the occurrence of the “lower” bodily states—but they nevertheless imper-
ceptibly shape our “higher” cognitive evaluation. This understanding also 
prompts us to ponder the extent to which Nietzsche was right in claiming 
that “our moral judgments and evaluations are only images and fantasies 
based on a physiological process unknown to us” and that “moralities are 
a Sign-language of affects.”14        
 
 
                                                 
14 Nietzsche 2019, Section 119; 2012, Section 187. 
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